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Abstract—Securing wireless sensor networks (WSNs) is a hard
problem. In particular, network access control is notoriously
difficult to achieve due to the inherent broadcast characteristics
of wireless communications: an attacker can easily target any
node in its transmission range and affect large parts of a sensor
network simultaneously. In this paper, we therefore propose a
distributed guardian system to protect a WSN based on physically
regulating channel access by means of selective interference. The
guardians are deployed alongside a sensor network, inspecting
all local traffic, classifying packets based on their content, and
destroying any malicious packet while still on the air. In that
sense, the system tries to gain “air dominance” over attackers.
A key challenge in implementing the guardian system is the
resulting real-time requirement in order to classify and destroy
packets during transmission. We present a USRP2 software radio
based guardian implementation for IEEE 802.15.4 that meets this
challenge; using an FPGA-based design we can even check for the
content of the very last payload byte of a packet and still prevent
its reception by a potential victim mote. Our evaluation shows
that the guardians effectively block 99.9 % of unauthorized traffic
in 802.15.4 networks in our experiments, without disturbing the
legitimate operations of the WSN.
Index Terms—Wireless communication, network security,
IEEE 802.15.4, wireless sensor networks, RF jamming, selective
interference, wireless firewall systems, software-defined radio.
I. MOTIVATION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are extending their
application scope from industrial monitoring and location
tracking to more personal and assistant technologies, such as
in health care [1], assisted living [2], and home energy saving
applications [3], [4]. ZigBee-enabled devices such as door
locks, occupancy sensors, panic buttons and electrical sockets
are already available as low-cost consumer electronics ready
to be deployed in users’ residences. Imagine an emergency
scenario where a gas leakage detector rises an alarm or a panic
button is pressed, and since an occupancy sensor reports an
occupied room, the door lock system decides to unlock and
provide emergency exits. While such a scenario is a perfect
motivation for using WSN technologies, it also provides an
attractive playground for an attacker.
In contrast to wired networks where physical control of
traffic is inherently given, wireless networks are open by
nature. For this reason, both IEEE 802.15.4 (at the link-
layer) and ZigBee (at the upper layers) define conventional
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security services for frame protection, device authorization,
key distribution, and key establishment. However, they also
take into account restrictions of battery-powered, performance-
limited and low-cost devices and offer tradeoffs between
resource requirements and security objectives, depending on
the particular application scenario. For example, according to
the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, there are three security modes:
(i) no security, (ii) access control lists (ACLs) based on a
source address, and (iii) secured mode, offering a choice of
strong security suites such as 128 bit AES-CCM. From a
security perspective, only the latter option offers protection in
an adversarial setting. Similarly, the ZigBee-2007 specification
describes key management and key exchange methods. It
specifies three types of keys: (i) master key, used as an
initial shared secret to generate link keys, (ii) link key,
dynamically generated secret keys shared only between two
devices, and (iii) network key, a global secret key shared
among all WSN devices. Yet, the master and link keys are
optional. Hence, it is realistic to assume that the security of
standard ZigBee networks may reside in only a single shared
key with the obvious risk that the capture of a single device
and extraction of the secret key could jeopardize the security
of the whole network. Along these lines, a recently available
security analysis toolbox called KillerBee [5] offers a set
of attack vectors, such as Over-the-Air (OTA) key sniffing,
MAC address manipulation, key extraction from memory,
and denial-of-service attacks based on flooding WSNs with
memory-consuming association requests.
While it is understandable that securing WSNs includes
optimizing various tradeoff “knobs,” we are concerned that this
complex task together with the distributed nature of WSNs will
result in inconsistent security configurations, misconfigured
clients, complex key revocations, and often in a complete res-
ignation from implementing any serious security measure. To
overcome these problems, we describe our design objectives
as a “wish list” of features that we believe should be part of
an effective and practical solution:
• Central control for WSN security policy enforcement
• Outsourcing security costs from sensor devices
• Transparency with respect to existing WSN protocols
• Generic protection supporting different communication
protocols
• On-demand security, i.e., paying security overheads
only during attacks.
In wired networks, many of these properties are found within
the concept of network firewalls. Firewalls are store-and-
forward devices located at the edges of networks, controlling
the access to the networks they are to protect, effectively
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2defining a trust boundary between the inside and outside world
by blocking any untrusted traffic from reaching the protected
devices. Network administrators are generally very much in
favor of firewalls as they enable a central control of policy
enforcement. This is, in principle, achieved in a transparent
way, without necessitating changes to existing protocols or
host configurations. A firewall’s actions are usually specified
by generic policies defined by filtering rules. Hence, it is hard
to deny that the concept of enforcing security policies by
blocking unwanted traffic before it reaches the clients could
also be attractive in supporting a practical approach to WSN
security. The problem is, however, that in contrast to wireline
networks, the broadcast nature of the wireless channel does
not provide any physical separation of the traffic and thus
setting up a boundary between inside and outside world is
much harder to achieve, especially when considering mobile
nodes. Consequently, preventing a packet from being received
cannot be based on simple and silent dropping at a store-and-
forward device but requires a different mechanism.
Recently, the idea of creating intentional radio frequency
interference and turning it against an adversary has shown to
be a valuable alternative (or addition) to conventional security
protocols. Such a “friendly jamming” paradigm has been
proposed to, e.g., protect implanted medical devices [6], [7] or
block suspicious transmissions in WSNs [8] (more details on
related work are given in Section VIII). Yet, these protocols
use radio interference either as a proactive countermeasure,
i.e., jamming all communication on a certain frequency band,
or demand additional higher-layer communication protocols.
Hence, the existing approaches violate our design objectives
of transparency, generic protection, and on-demand security.
In this work, we describe a guardian system operating at
the physical layer that is able to inspect packets (including
both packet header and payload) that are already on the
air. Then, using a predefined security policy, it classifies a
packet in real-time and, in case of policy violations, gen-
erates a “surgically” precise interference that introduces bit
errors at legitimate receivers such that the malicious packet
is discarded. The security policies are centrally defined and
enforced (→ central control) and wireless sensors are not
required to implement complex security mechanisms such as
per-device packet filtering [9] (→ outsourcing security costs).
Since blocked packets are essentially not received by the
sensor devices, the WSN is not aware of this countermeasure,
i.e., what is correctly received in the network has already
been verified (→ transparency). And because this protection
method is implemented on the physical layer, it is independent
of any higher-layer protocols (→ generic protection). Finally,
the reactive behavior of the guardian system only activates
if packets that violate security policies are on the air, which
means that there is presently an actual attack against the
WSN (→ on-demand security). The system is implemented on
the widely used software radio platform USRP2, which also
facilitates its usage as an open experimental platform. Besides
meeting the design goals, we make the following contributions:
• We present an FPGA-based system implementation with
an overall reaction delay of 39 µs, allowing a per-packet
classification based on packet contents, up to the very
last payload byte. The system is very configurable, sup-
porting the definition of access policies in the style of
iptables.
• Our overall system evaluation shows that even with very
limited interference duration (26 µs per packet) and large
distances (up to 18 m), the system is able to destroy
99.9 % of malicious packets in our experiments.
• The effectiveness of our protection approach is validated
in an IEEE 802.15.4 sensor network using the open-
source toolbox KillerBee (as a realistic attacker).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section II,
we describe the key concepts of our guardian system in more
detail. A theoretical protection analysis of these concepts
directly follows in Section III. Section IV presents the most
interesting details of the guardian node implementation. A
comprehensive testbed evaluation of critical system aspects is
provided in Section V. In Section VI, we illustrate the potential
value of the guardian system in several real-world application
scenarios. Section VII provides a discussion of limitations,
some open issues, and future research opportunities. In Sec-
tion VIII, we thoroughly review related work and conclude the
paper in Section IX.
II. AIR DOMINANCE CONCEPT
In this section, we outline how the physical layer protection
of our guardian system operates in general, and what protec-
tion properties are achieved by it.
A. System Model and Assumptions
We consider a wireless sensor network scenario with three
types of devices (see Fig. 1):
1) Wireless sensor nodes that perform a distributed sensing
application; these nodes are the target of attacks and
hence are referred to as victim nodes v.
2) Attacker nodes a that attempt to send malicious packets
to victim nodes v to disrupt their intended network
operation.
3) Guardian nodes g that want to prevent victim nodes v
from receiving malicious packets from attackers a.
The sensor nodes communicate using IEEE 802.15.4 on the
2.4 GHz band and we assume that all nodes send and receive
on the same channel. We further assume that the victim sensor
nodes v act in compliance to the IEEE 802.15.4 standard and
that they discard received packets for which the CRC check-
sum is incorrect. The CRC checksum is a 16 bit field calculated
over a packet’s payload and headers. The CRC checksum is
erroneous when a packet has at least one symbol error (we
do not consider error coding mechanisms such as [10]). We
further assume that the victim nodes communicate without
header encryption, the guardian nodes can therefore eavesdrop
and decode any transmitted packets. This is no limitation
of our concept for two reasons: First, header encryption is
generally not used in wireless networks because all messages
must be received, decrypted, and checked for integrity using
all available link keys, which is extremely inefficient; the
IEEE 802.15.4 standard only considers data confidentiality
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Figure 1: Sensor network deployment with co-located guardian nodes. In our protection analysis (Section III), we use the
distances on the right-hand side to show that the maximal attacker distance dav is drastically reduced by the guardian system.
as a security service [11, §5.5.6]. Second, even if header
encryption is used guardians can be given access to the
network’s cryptographic material because they are part of the
network infrastructure. Then a guardian can decrypt packets
during transmission (there are efficient FPGA implementations
of AES available [12]) and block them, given the packets are
longer than one AES block.
B. Guardian Operation
Guardian nodes are responsible for blocking unauthorized
traffic sent by the attacker nodes to the victim nodes. Each
guardian continuously performs the following steps:
1) Monitor the RF channel for suspicious transmissions.
2) Decide whether a detected packet is allowed or not
(before it is fully received by sensor motes).
3) If the packet is not allowed, briefly emit interference to
destroy the packet.
Packets are destroyed in Step 3) by exploiting the CRC
mechanism of IEEE 802.15.4. Since the CRC of packets at
victim nodes is erroneous when at least one symbol is wrong,
packets that are hit strong enough by interference from a
guardian node are discarded by the victim receivers.
To react quickly, the guardians operate autonomously. This
means that a packet may be hit by multiple guardians when
they detect that a packet that is not allowed. We see in our
evaluation (→ Section V-D) that this independent operation of
the guardian nodes is beneficial, particularly in environments
where individual guardians may not reliably overhear all
packets. The drawback of this approach is, of course, that
we introduce more interference than necessary, which could
be problematic for the operation of the sensor network or
other wireless networks in the same frequency band. One
system design goal for the guardians is therefore to make
this interference as “friendly” as possible by using very short
periods of interference and using waveforms that are effective
at the target sensor nodes but negligibly disturbing for other
wireless networking technologies operating in the vicinity.
This is important because an unintentional derogation of co-
existing networks could prevent a certification of guardian
devices or reduce the acceptance of their deployments; we
discuss legal aspects in Section VII-B.
C. Guardian Design Considerations
To be effective the guardians should reliably detect all
packets on the air and interfere with all unauthorized ones.
At the same time, the interference should be limited in order
to minimize possible effects on concurrent communications on
the same frequency band. We next analyze the design tradeoffs
for the implementation of the guardians’ receive and blocking
primitives.
1) Reflections on Guardian Detection Sensitivity: In order
to correctly detect and demodulate a packet at a receiver,
the incoming signal power at the antenna must be greater
than the receiver sensitivity. This sensitivity represents the
minimum signal power at the antenna that results in a specified
packet error performance. The receiver sensitivity is given by
S = NTNFSNRmin [13], where NT is the thermal noise,
NF is the noise figure of the particular receiver and SNRmin
a modulation-specific threshold for the minimum required
signal-to-noise ratio. For IEEE 802.15.4-compliant receivers
with O-QPSK modulation on the 2.4 GHz band, optimal co-
herent detection, and a maximum packet error rate of 1 %, the
theoretical sensitivity limit is Smin = −112.2 dBm. However
the standard only demands a sensitivity of at least −85 dBm,
and commercial radio modules exhibit sensitivities ranging
between −92 dBm to −110 dBm.1
Our analysis in Section III shows that the guardians benefit
from a high sensitivity. Next, we discuss several approaches to
help increasing the guardian’s detection performance. Lanzis-
era and Pister [14] show that 6.6 dB are generally sacrificed
by design decisions, but 5.8 dB of this can easily be reclaimed
with improved receiver implementations. A better sensitivity
can also be provided by using low noise components and more
efficient demodulating schemes.
The sensitivity of guardian nodes can even be designed to
go beyond the theoretical sensitivity limit of −112.2 dBm of
regular receivers in sensor nodes. At −112.2 dBm, an ideal
IEEE 802.15.4 receiver will exhibit less than 1 % packet
errors, however, guardian nodes may exploit the fact that it
is not necessary to receive all bits in a packet correctly to
successfully classify it. Bit errors that occur outside the portion
of the packet that matches a rule have no effect on the detection
1An online comparison of various commercial receiver implementations
with links to the corresponding data sheets is available at http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Comparison_of_802.15.4_radio_modules
4and may hence be tolerated by guardian nodes. Even bit errors
that occur within the portion of the packet of a rule may be
tolerated at the cost of occasionally destroying a packet that
does not match the specified rule. By tolerating up to 10 %
BER, the sensitivity can be improved by more than 11 dB
[14]. Significant detection improvements are hence realizable.
The sensitivity gain of tolerating bit errors is substantial while
causing only few false positives. For example, considering
a blocking rule that is matched to a 32 bit address field,
if we tolerate a 2 bit error (6.25 % BER) and assuming a
uniform address distribution, the false positive rate remains
below 0.00002 % while the sensitivity is increased by 10 dB.
However, this analysis may be affected by other rules in the
active rule set if they consider the same portions of the packet.
We assume in this work that modest improvements are possible
and leave a detailed analysis of achievable sensitivity gains to
future work.
2) Reflections on Guardian Interference: To achieve
“friendly” interference, the duration of the blocking signals
should be as short as possible. In IEEE 802.15.4, one erro-
neous symbol already leads to a wrong CRC checksum, and
the packet at the victim node is discarded. Hence, a guardian
who detects an unauthorized packet ideally needs to interfere
with that packet for the duration of a single symbol (16 µs).
We investigate in Section V-C that, under real-world settings,
it requires a slightly higher duration of selective guardian in-
terference to effectively block all undesired packets. However,
this short interference period is still limited and negligible
compared to the signal duration of the packet emitted by
the attacker. A wireless sensor network will hence not be
significantly impacted since IEEE 802.15.4 nodes perform
carrier sensing and should not transmit concurrently with the
attacker anyway.
Another aspect of friendly interference relates to the choice
of the interference waveform. It is well known that certain
waveforms are more effective at causing bit errors than others
[15]. The effectiveness of the interference waveform depends
on the particular modulation scheme and the filters at the
receivers. Advantageously, wireless sensor nodes are generally
not designed to suppress in-band interference well. They only
low-pass filter the baseband signal and send the output directly
to the demodulator [16]. We see in our experimental evaluation
in Section V-C that a continuous sine wave, a waveform that
is generally known as being ineffective, happens to destroy
packets even more effectively in IEEE 802.15.4 with the same
power budget than band-limited white noise or modulated
signals. Using a very narrowband waveform like this provides
the advantage that other technologies like WLAN are able to
efficiently suppress this kind of interference [17] and hence
remain unaffected by the guardians.
III. PROTECTION ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the nature of protection offered
by our system of distributed guardians. For ease of exposition,
we deliberately use simple propagation and receiver models to
deliver the key insights on the concept (we use log-distance
path loss and an SINR-based receiver model). The notation
used in this section is summarized in Table I for convenience.
Term Description
dav Distance between the attacker and the victim
dag Distance between the attacker and the guardian
dgv Distance between victim and the guardian
Pa Radiated power by the attacker
Pg Radiated (interference) power by the guardian
Sv , Sg Receiver sensitivity of victim and guardian
γSIR Signal-to-interference threshold for reception
α Path loss coefficient
L (d) Path loss and fading function of distance d
Aforce,Astealth Attackers using a brute-force or stealthy strategy
RA Resulting attack range, performance metric for attackers
Table I: Notation used in the protection analysis.
A. Protection Constraints
For a guardian g to protect a victim node v from an
attacker a, the guardian must be able to detect the signals
from the attacker and interfere with the attacker’s signal at the
victim node such that the packet is discarded. This leads to the
following two necessary conditions for guardian protection.
Condition 1 (Detection): Let Pa be the emitted signal power
of the attacker and L (dag) be the path loss and fading between
the attacker and the guardian. The guardian is able to detect
the malicious signals iff
PaL (dag) ≥ Sg,
where Sg is the sensitivity of the guardian.
Condition 2 (Destruction): Let Pa be the emitted signal
power of the attacker, Pg be the emitted power of the
guardian’s interference signal, and L (dav), L (dgv) be the
path loss between attacker–victim and guardian–victim, re-
spectively. The guardian is able to destroy the packet at the
victim if the signal-to-interference ratio is below a certain
threshold
PaL (dav)
PgL (dgv)
< γSIR,
where the threshold γSIR is determined by the modulation
scheme, the interference waveform and how well the victim
node is able to suppress such interference. If the interference
waveform is zero-mean white gaussian noise, the threshold
γSIR is between 0 dB and 3 dB according to the IEEE 802.15.4
standard [11]. More effective waveforms by the guardians
leads to higher values of γSIR. We evaluated this value for the
MICAz platform with several waveforms in Section V-C and
find an additional gain of 3–5 dB in jamming effectiveness.
A sensor network remains protected if there exists at least
one guardian that fulfills these two conditions for each attacker
and victim node pair. In the remaining of this section, we
discuss that these conditions are generally easy to fulfill
as there exists a large asymmetry between the capability
requirements for attackers and guardians.
B. Attacker Models
The goal of the attacker is to inject packets of its choice
into the protected network. We consider two attacker strategies
against the guardians:
Brute-force attacker Aforce: the attacker tries to overcome
the guardian’s interference by using a large transmission power
Pa:
PaL(dav)
PgL(dgv)
> γSIR.
5Stealthy attacker Astealth: the attacker tries to choose a small
transmission power Pa such that the injected packet is received
only by the victim but is not detected by the guardian. The
attack is successful iff
PaL(dav) ≥ Sv and PaL(dag) < Sg.
While the first strategy is easy to implement, it also leads
to a steeply increased energy cost of the attacker (an analysis
for 802.15.4 is given in Proposition 8). The second strategy
is more challenging to implement in practice as very fine-
grained power control and a clever positioning of the attacker
is required to perform the attack successfully.
C. Attacker–Guardian Asymmetry
To illustrate the asymmetry between an attacker attempting
to inject malicious packets and the guardian protecting the
victim nodes, we consider a log-normal path loss model
L(d) = L0d
−α, with reference path loss L0, distance d, and
path loss coefficient α. We use the following metric to capture
the asymmetry between an attacker and a guardian:
Definition 1 (Attack Range). The (worst-case2) attack range
R is the maximum distance dav between attacker a and victim
node v such that an attack still succeeds.
An attacker wants the attack range to be as large as
possible such that it may launch the attack from arbitrary
locations and still remain undetected in the physical world.
A large attack range further makes an attacker powerful as
it can attack more nodes from a single location. From the
perspective of the network, a small attack range is desired
as it forces an attacker to expose itself in the physical world
and minimizes the number of victim nodes that an attacker
may attack simultaneously. If the attacker is constrained in
terms of reachable locations, e.g., when the attacker can only
attack from outside a building, the number of sensor motes
in its attack range may also be zero for all reachable attack
positions, effectively thwarting the attack.
Example 2. Without a guardian, the attack range RAforce of
an attacker Aforce using a powerful COTS transmitter (Pa =
20 dBm) and MICAz victims (Sv = −94 dBm) under the log-
normal model with path loss parameters specified in the IEEE
802.15.4 standard [11, Annex E.5.3]3 is R = 384.51m.
The effect of an active guardian is to considerably reduce
the attack range. We derive bounds on the attack range for
both attacker models Astealth and Aforce in the following.
Proposition 3. The attack range RAstealth of attacker Astealth is
bounded by dvg/
(
α
√
Sv/Sg − 1
)
if a guardian is present.
Proof: To prevent detection, the attacker must satisfy two
conditions simultaneously: its received signal power at the
2This notion of attack range is under worst-case assumptions where attacker,
victim, and guardian are on one line with the victim in the middle, maximizing
the distance between attacker and guardian dag for a given attacker–victim
distance dav .
3We converted the parameters given in the standard to our non-logarithmic
model: reference distance d0 = 8m, α = 3.3, path loss at d0 is L0 =
dα0 10
58.5/10. Later derivations use distance ratios and are thus independent
of the choice of L0.
victim must be above the sensitivity level of the victim and
below the sensitivity of the guardian:
Pad
−α
av ≥ Sv (1)
Pad
−α
ag < Sg (2)
Following (1) and (2), the attacker must choose a power Pa
that satisfies dαavSv ≤ Pa < dαagSg . Thus, such a Pa only
exists iff dαavSv < d
α
agSg . Using this condition and the relation
dag ≤ dav + dgv (by triangle inequality), we find that the
attacker Astealth can only remain undetected if its distance to
v satisfies
dav <
dvg
α
√
Sv/Sg − 1
. (3)
The bound is independent of the attacker’s transmit power.
The asymmetry with the attacker model Astealth is provided
by the sensitivity ratio Sv/Sg (as discussed in Section II-C1):
the higher this ratio, the smaller is the attack range RAstealth .
Additionally, this range only applies if the attacker maxi-
mizes its distance to the guardian, such that it has to find
a position where the attack is feasible first. The following
example applies typical values to illustrate how the attack
range is considerably reduced compared to Example 2 where
no guardian is present.
Example 4. In Section VI-B, we present an indoor appli-
cation scenario with MICAz sensor motes and a KillerBee
attacker. Assuming a near-optimal receiver at the guardian
with a sensitivity of −110 dBm (−112.2 dBm is the theoretical
sensitivity limit of an ideal 802.15.4 receiver), tolerating a
limited number of bit errors and hence a non-zero false positive
rate with a conservative improvement of 6 dB to keep the false
positive rates low (say less than 0.001 %), the sensitivity of the
guardian becomes Sg = −116 dBm, resulting in a ratio Sv/Sg
of 22 dB. With a maximal protection distance dgv = 10m and
α = 3.3, the attack range decreases to RAstealth = 2.75m,
which is a reduction by a factor of 140 compared to the case
where no guardian is present.
Proposition 5. The attack range RAforce for attacker model
Aforce is bounded by α
√
Pa/(γSIRPg)dgv .
Proof: If the attack signal is detected, a brute-force
attacker has still the opportunity to overcome the interference
signal if
Pad
−α
av
Pgd
−α
gv
≥ γSIR.
Consequently, the attacker must choose its distance such that
dav ≤ α
√
Pa
γSIRPg
dgv. (4)
The attacker is assumed to be power-limited, such that this
bound exists.
Example 6. In Section VI-C, a sensor network with several
MICAz motes captured by an attacker is considered, which
our guardian system effectively disconnects from the network.
MICAz motes (like many other COTS transmitters) have a
maximum output power of Pa = 0 dBm, the transmit power
of a guardian node is Pg = 20 dBm, and the interference
waveform being used is assumed as γSIR ≈ 3 dB. With a
6maximal protection distance dgv = 10m, the attack range
RAforce of the brute-force attacker is brought down to 0.70 m.
Last but not least, a brute-force attacker also has to pay a
price in terms of energy investment to successfully mount its
attack.
Definition 7 (Energy cost). The energy cost of an attacker
Aforce is the ratio of the energy required by the attacker to
send a packet over the energy required by the guardian to
block the packet.
Proposition 8. The energy cost is
Pad
−α
av ` · 32 µs
Pgd
−α
gv tinterfere
, (5)
where ` denotes the packet length in bytes and tinterfere the
duration of the interference signal from the guardian.
Example 9. If, for ease of exposition, we assume that the
attacker and the guardian emit at the same power and are at
the same distance from the victim, the (received) power ratio
Pad
−α
av /Pgd
−α
gv is equal to one. Considering a typical IEEE
802.15.4 packet size of 32 bytes and a necessary interference
duration of tinterfere = 16 µs to destroy one symbol, the energy
cost is 64. In other words, the guardian needs to invest 64 times
less transmit energy to destroy a packet than the attacker needs
to invest to transmit the packet to the victim.
This observation shows again an asymmetry in the required
energy between an attacker and a guardian. While an attacker
might in some cases still be able to slip through the protection
of the guardians, the effort required to do so is considerably
higher than the effort required by the guardians. This asym-
metry is precisely what we refer to as air dominance, where
guardians are able to effectively and efficiently control and
block undesired transmissions from attackers before they can
reach the network.
IV. GUARDIAN IMPLEMENTATION
After introducing the concept, we describe the implementa-
tion of our system that performs the detection, classification,
and destruction of malicious packets. The system design is
driven by the need for low-latency operation, as the reaction
time of the system must be smaller than the duration of
a packet to both classify and destroy it. And because the
classification is based on packet content, the allowed reaction
time should be only a fraction of a packet’s duration, i.e., in
the order of tens of microseconds.
We implement the guardian nodes on the USRP2 software-
defined radio (SDR) platform. The SDR paradigm allows full
physical layer access by the guardian; in contrast, off-the-
shelf receivers do not allow low-latency access to detected
symbols, nor do they offer freedom in choosing the transmitted
interference waveform. However, these factors are crucial
to enable a deep look into packets and to use the most
effective interference waveform with a given power budget.
For example, related reactive jamming systems implemented
on sensor motes [8], [18], [19] do not allow to classify based
on content and to destroy packets during transmission. Still, an
implementation on the USRP2 is not straightforward because
the time to classify and intercept a packet is below 500 µs,
which forces tight timing constraints on the system. In the
common host-based architecture for software radio using GNU
Radio, where digital samples are forwarded to a host via
Ethernet and signal processing is performed on the host CPU,
large and non-deterministic latencies prevent to meet real-
time requirements [20]. In our implementation, we fulfill the
requirements of real-time detection and subsequent destruction
of a packet on the air; we design the guardian as a stand-
alone system, completely implemented on the USRP2’s FPGA
and on-board micro-controller (our previous work is based
on the same framework [21], [22]). The system is optimized
for speed to reach reaction times of tens of microseconds to
allow access to the full payload and still reliably destroy the
packet. The system components are depicted in Fig. 2, the
workflow of the system is (from left to right): (i) detecting and
demodulating relevant transmissions, (ii) forming decisions
based on the packet content, and (iii) interfering with malicious
packets. The system currently supports the 2.4 GHz PHY of
IEEE 802.15.4. Next, we provide a brief description of each
functional component.
A. Detection Subsystem
This subsystem continuously scans the RF medium to detect
any packet that might be received by the network and receives
and delivers the packet’s content to the subsequent decision
subsystem. It consists of a receiver optimized for speed
that synchronizes to packets and demodulates the contained
bytes, and a framer that interprets the bytes according to the
IEEE 802.15.4 standard, providing access to header fields and
payload bytes.
802.15.4 receiver. We implemented an IEEE 802.15.4 re-
ceiver using coherent O-QPSK demodulation and a correlating
direct sequence de-spreader to recover symbols in FPGA
logic. The de-spreader removes the direct sequence spreading
code used in the 2.4 GHz PHY. The receiver directly operates
on the stream of complex (I/Q) samples coming from the
USRP2’s analog-to-digital converter: it first synchronizes with
the incoming preamble, then detects each detected symbol (4
bit of information), and finally delivers it to the framer. The
FPGA implementation ensures that the detection latency is
limited, we measured a delay in the receiver below 4 µs from
the presence of the signal on the channel to the time it is
available for interpretation by the rule checker.
Packet framing. This component interprets the received
symbols according to the IEEE 802.15.4 packet definition,
granting access to header fields and payload. IEEE 802.15.4
supports several address modes that use varying header layouts
that must be supported by the framer. This component also
notifies the rule checker that a new packet was detected via
interrupts and provides a memory mapping that can be queried
to gain access to header fields and payload bytes.
B. Decision Subsystem
The decision system is triggered via interrupts by the packet
framer when a pre-defined point in the packet is reached (e.g.,
when the full link layer header is available) to trigger the
7Figure 2: Component diagram of the guardian implementation. We consider two different rule checker implementations
(firmware/FPGA).
decision process on whether the packet should be blocked or
not. The current implementation supports decisions based on
packet content and received signal strength. However, spoofing
or replay attacks are challenging to detect based on these
features alone. Additional possibilities to classify packets, such
as more robust physical layer features (angle of arrival, device
fingerprints, etc.) are part of our future work, and are discussed
further in Section VII-A.
Rule checker. The rule checker classifies incoming packets
according to a pre-defined policy. It is the critical com-
ponent for real-time operation because the overall reaction
time mainly depends on its execution time. Therefore we
have implemented and evaluated two different versions: (i)
firmware code written in C and running on the USRP2’s (soft-)
micro-controller, which offers runtime reconfigurability but is
comparatively slow, and (ii) an implementation in FPGA logic
that reduces the reaction time, but the security policy must be
specified at compile time. In both implementations, the rule
checker notifies the interference subsystem with an interrupt
that a short burst of interference must presently be generated
to destroy the malicious packet.
Rule system. The firmware-based rule checker allows to
define content-based rules in the style of iptables, defining
rule chains that consist of one or more rules, each with zero
or more matches (such as source or destination address).
We implemented a command line tool (gtables), which
generates a data structure that can be directly interpreted by
the firmware rule checker. An example is the following rule
definition with two matches (preventing the reception of all
control packets going to the broadcast address in PAN 0x22):
gtables -A -m dst --pan 0x22 --addr 0xFFFF
-m type --ctrl -j DROP
This mechanism allows to define complex access policies
and deploy them on the distributed guardians. The FPGA
rule checker uses hardware gates to compare detected packet
bytes to a table of predefined values in parallel, such that the
execution time is considerably reduced.
Administration interface. We use the USRP2’s Ether-
net interface to update the active rule set of the firmware
implementation, set operation parameters (center frequency,
transmission power), and collect system statistics, from a
central point of administration. The USRP2 supports the
IP protocol over Ethernet, such that all guardians can be
connected over existing networks and configured remotely by
a single administrator.
C. Selective Interference Subsystem
When a packet is classified as malicious, the guardian takes
action and prevents the reception of the packet by its protected
sensor motes.
TX waveform generator. As described in Section 2, the
efficiency of intentional interference depends on the waveform
that is transmitted, captured in the detection threshold γSIR.
With a software-defined radio, arbitrary waveforms can be
specified using a sequence of I/Q samples, which completely
defines a transmitted signal. Our guardian implementation
supports continuous wave (CW), noise, and arbitrary IEEE
802.15.4-modulated symbols as interference waveforms.
Transmission. The I/Q samples are finally sent to a digital-
to-analog converter (DAC), modulated onto a carrier in the
2.4 GHz band, and amplified up to a maximum output power
of 20 dBm (100 mW). External antennas and amplifiers can be
used to boost the effectively radiated power further.
V. GUARDIAN EVALUATION
We are interested in the real-time performance character-
istics of the guardian, especially with regard to the system
challenges of low-latency and reliable packet dropping at
the receiver. We evaluate how well the different subsystems
of the guardian cooperate to achieve a selective blocking
of malicious packets. The relevant time parameters of the
guardian operation (depicted in Fig. 3) are described first and
then evaluated in the following subsections.
• The IEEE 802.15.4 receiver scans the wireless channel for
relevant signals. Once a packet is discovered, the system
starts demodulating the incoming signal, interpreting the
bits as header fields according to the standard. The
rule checker starts after receiving the packet bytes of
interest, i.e., after the time duration denoted as tlisten. This
duration depends on how deep the packet is inspected.
For example, a typical duration for the physical and link
layer headers of IEEE 802.15.4 is tlisten = 480 µs.
• After the features required by the rule checker are
available to the guardian, the rule checker begins to
classify the packet according to its active rule set. For
the firmware-based rule checker, this set is traversed in
sequential order. Thus, the required time (denoted as
tdecide) depends both on the number of rules as well
as the number of matches in each rule. For the FPGA-
based checker, several rules are checked in parallel; we
measured delays below 10 µs.
• In case the verdict of the rule checker is to destroy the
packet, the hardware initiates the interference process
by preparing a waveform and starting its transmission.
8Figure 3: Guardian in operation: first, the packet’s signal is demodulated to access its content for classification. The guardian
must wait for the payload bytes to arrive (tlisten) before the rule checker can start. When the packet is declared malicious
(after tdecide), the transmission of interference is prepared (tinit), and the packet destroyed (tinterfere).
We measured this delay (tinit) to be small (2–3 µs) and
deterministic, so that it is not a limiting factor in the
reaction time performance.
• Finally, an interfering signal is applied to the wireless
channel, with a duration of tinterfere. The signal must be
sufficiently long to reliably destroy the packet at the
receiver, but should also be as short as possible to limit
the interference with co-existing networks.
• The overall system reaction time is denoted as treact,
which is defined as the time from the start of classification
to the end of the interference, i.e., treact = tdecide + tinit +
tinterfere.
We proceed by first evaluating each system component de-
scribed in the previous section to determine its time parame-
ters, and then evaluate the overall system performance.
A. Detection Accuracy
This part of the evaluation is concerned with the speed and
precision of the packet detection subsystem. A correct opera-
tion is crucial because only detected packets are classified (and
destroyed if necessary). We evaluate the guardian’s ability to
detect packets correctly while varying the distance between
attacker and guardian (dag). Due to path loss, the signal
strength gradually reduces, making it harder to distinguish
signal from noise. As reference, we compare the performance
of a standard-compliant MICAz receiver in this experiment to
observe if the sensitivity of the guardian is better than that of
the motes in the protected network.
Experimental methodology: The receiver under test (either
guardian or MICAz mote) is placed at a fixed position at one
end of the experimentation area, a 3 m wide hallway. This
indoor scenario is a challenging test for the receiver because
multipath effects and inter-symbol-interference (ISI) increase
the difficulty to detect signals correctly. The guardian runs on
a USRP2 with an XCVR2450 transceiver and omni-directional
antennas (3 dBi gain). The attacker is a MICAz mote with its
default antenna, using its maximum output power (0 dBm) to
transmit 100 packets/s (which contain 48 symbols and have a
duration of 768 µs) for 10 s.
Starting from a 1 m attacker–receiver distance, we then
move the attacker to a set of measurement positions with
distances dag = 1, . . . , 30m. For each position, the attacker
transmits 1000 broadcast packets. The receiver (guardian or
MICAz) counts the successfully detected packets (confirmed
by a CRC check) for the packet reception ratio.
Blocking rule Byte offset Max. treact Firmware FPGA
Start-of-Frame Delim. 5 864 µs
√ √
Frame Control Field 7–8 768 µs
√ √
Source Address 14–15 544 µs
√ √
Payload byte #16 27 160 µs
√ √
Last payload byte 30 64 µs × √
Table II: Impact of overall reaction delay on feasible blocking
rules. The symbol
√
indicates that the guardian can use the
respective blocking rule and still destroy the packet.
Results: The detection results are shown in Fig. 4b. The
COTS receiver performs well in this experiment, with a detec-
tion radius of approximately 20 meters. With 12 out of 20000
packets in this range, only a limited number of packets was not
received successfully. Our FPGA-based receiver implementa-
tion has an increased reception radius (up to 25 m), indicating a
higher sensitivity compared to the MICAz mote. However, the
performance for longer distances deteriorates slightly because
the receiver is sensitive to multipath fading effects, causing
a fraction of packets to be missed in some locations. We
mitigate this effect by using a second guardian. In this setup,
the number of missed packets is again reduced. Overall, the
system fulfills the goal of a better receiver sensitivity discussed
in Section 2, such that the guardians are suitable to protect
sensor nodes from a distance.
B. Reaction Delay
By reaction delay treact, we refer to the time from receiving
the content bytes of interest until the interference is finished.
This delay affects how deep the guardian can look into a
packet, because the interference must overlap with it. It is
mainly dependent on the execution time tdecide of the guardian
rule checker to decide whether the packet should be destroyed.
An overly slow decision process may shift the selective inter-
ference behind the end of the packet. We put both firmware
and FPGA-based rule checker to the test.
Experimental methodology. The measurements are taken
using the FPGA’s 100 MHz internal clock to record times-
tamps, which allows us to reach a timing precision of 10 ns.
The rule evaluation is timed from the instant an hardware
interrupt signals the detection of an IEEE 802.15.4 header
by the framer to the instant the rule system returns a verdict
on how to treat the packet. In the firmware-based rule system,
this is the return of the C function call that activates the rule
checker. For the FPGA-based rule checker, the timestamp is
taken when the rule checker interrupt to start the interference
arrives in the firmware.
9(a) The guardian system under evaluation in one
of our experimental settings.
(b) Receiver sensitivity, detection performance:
packet reception ratio with increasing distance.
The guardian shows a better sensitivity, allow-
ing to protect sensor motes from a distance.
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Figure 4: Guardian performance evaluation: experimental setting, detection performance, and rule checking delay.
We vary the number of rules in the chain, and the number
of matches in each rule (each match is a C function that reads
data from the framer and compares these values to constants
stored in the chain). The rules are chosen such that none of
them matches the packet, hence we measure the worst-case
run time where the chain is traversed completely. As the rules
are evaluated in parallel in the FPGA-based implementation,
increasing the rule set size affects the FPGA resource usage
and not the timing.
Firmware-based rule checker results. The compound
execution times depicted in Fig. 4c show that the reaction
delay is depending on the rule set used. The reason is that
our implementation follows the general design of iptables
using linked lists with variable size, such that a small overhead
occurs for the evaluation of each rule chain, rule, and the
matches contained in a rule to traverse the list. As the used
micro-controller only supports a single thread, the required
execution time is deterministic but increasing with each rule.
To break the delays into components, we analyzed the rule
checker implementation in depth. First, a constant time of
4.03 µs is needed to enter the interrupt handler, jump into the
rule checker and back, and trigger the interference process.
This cost is independent of the chain’s contents and is paid
for each detected packet. To evaluate one rule in the chain,
the guardian needs 0.26 µs for evaluation (mainly the time to
traverse the chain). Evaluating the time needed for individual
rule, each match needs 0.34 µs to start the execution of the
associated test function. The overall running time of a match
function depends on the logic of the match itself. Considering
the address match, a match with representative complexity,
the execution takes 1.86 µs before the function returns. All
matches in a rule are checked sequentially, such that the
execution times add up. For example, the execution of one
rule with 3 matches accounts to 5.58 µs. So, when considering
a chain with 20 rules of 3 matches each, the guardian requires
116 µs or approximately 4 payload bytes to react in the worst
case (when all rules are traversed).
FPGA-based rule checker results. To allow more deter-
ministic decision delays and to support a deeper look into the
packet, we also implemented a rule checker implemented in
FPGA logic that is less flexible but provides faster reaction
times. Using this approach we are able to cut the latency
down to a limited number of FPGA clock cycles, i.e., below
one microsecond up to 10 µs. This enables us to achieve an
overall reaction time of treact = 39 µs, even with complex rule
sets. This means that the guardian can base its decision on the
complete payload and still hit the CRC bytes at the end of the
packet to cause a packet drop.
C. Interference Waveforms and Duration
We are interested in the optimal waveform that offers a high
chance to intercept a packet (by providing a beneficial γSIR),
and the minimum interference duration that introduces bit
errors into the packet with high probability.
Interference waveform. We tested three candidate wave-
forms for their ability to prevent a packet reception: a con-
tinuous wave (CW) positioned at the center frequency of the
channel, white noise with a bandwidth of 500 kHz around the
center frequency, and random symbols spread and modulated
as specified in IEEE 802.15.4. We evaluated their performance
according to the required transmit power to achieve a packet
reception ratio of 0 %. The results are shown in Fig. 5a:
the continuous wave offers the most energy-efficient way to
interfere with reception against the sensor platform we use,
with the additional benefits that it is easy to generate on
the SDR and that co-existing technologies such as WLAN
filter out this type of interference relatively well, hence their
operation is not disturbed by the guardian.
Minimum interference duration. Using the CW wave-
form, we evaluated the minimum interference duration on the
channel to reliably destroy a packet. Guardian and victim are
placed in close vicinity such that the guardian’s interference
is stronger than the signal of each packet (see Fig. 4a). The
results in Fig. 5b show that an interference duration of 26 µs is
sufficient to destroy a packet. This result has two implications:
first, the energy cost of the attacker is high; while the attacker
must transmit a complete packet to be successful (e.g., 1024 µs
for a 32 byte packet), the guardian invests 40 times less
energy to successfully prevent the reception. Second, the
interference duty cycle of the guardian is very low, minimizing
the effect on co-existing networks. In the experiments in the
next section (100 attack packets/s), the guardian only transmits
for less than one millisecond each second. We discuss the
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(a) Comparison of the packet reception ratio for
three interference waveforms: efficient wave-
forms increase the detection threshold γSIR and
thus require less transmit power for blocking.
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Figure 5: Performance evaluation: interference waveforms, minimum interference duration, and overall system performance.
issue of interference further in Section VII-B. The presented
experiments are based on preliminary results published in [21].
D. Protection Performance
The most important aspect of our system is to effectively
block malicious packets at the sensor motes. We consider the
performance of the overall system here, i.e., both detection
and selective interference are used in combination.
Experimental methodology. We place one or two
guardian(s) at one end of the hallway, with the same mea-
surement positions as in the detection experiments, i.e., dag =
1, . . . , 30m. Attacker and victim (both MICAz) are moved
together with a constant distance of one meter (dav = 1m),
providing the attacker with excellent conditions. For each
position, the attacker sends 100 packets/s back-to-back with
0 dBm output power. Under this attack rate, the guardian must
also prove that the transmission operation does not affect its
subsequent detection performance and that its turnaround time
is small enough to support high frequency attacks.
We repeat this attack 10 times for each distance, slightly
moving the attacker each time, to lower the effects of multipath
fading on the experimental results. We use the firmware-based
rule system; the rule used is to search for all broadcast packets
originating in the current PAN:
gtables -A -m dst --addr 0xFFFF --pan 0x22
-j DROP
All packets sent by the attacker match this specification,
thus the guardian has to interfere with all attacker packets.
Results. A single guardian successfully prevents a packet
reception in 98–99 % for distances up to 15 m, despite the
close proximity of attacker and victim (see Fig. 5c). The
outcome of this experiment is similar to the detection ex-
periment, suggesting that the system performance is mainly
influenced by the guardian’s receiver implementation. Similar
to the detection case, two guardians located at the same
position effectively counter the issue of 1–2 % packet misses,
and achieve a combined 99.9 % protection rate up 18 m. The
two guardians only missed 19 out of 18000 packets up to this
distance.
E. Summary
The guardian implementation allows real-time detection of
malicious packets with a high accuracy during their transmis-
Parameter Description Firmware FPGA
tdecide Rule checker execution time (var.) 116 µs 10 µs
tinit Duration decision–start transmitting 3 µs 3 µs
tinterfere Interference duration for packet drop 26 µs 26 µs
treact Overall reaction delay 145 µs 39 µs
Table III: Time parameters of our guardian implementation,
indicating that packets can still be destroyed after observing a
large part of their contents.
sion and a reliable destruction before the packet may arrive
at a receiver. The results are summarized in Tables II and
III. The system is able to classify and destroy 99.9 % of the
packets, even if the classification depends on the last byte in
the payload, because the reaction time of the system (39 µs)
is shorter than the duration of the CRC field (64 µs).
VI. APPLICATIONS
This section demonstrates the ability of our guardian system
to control wireless channel access in order to protect IEEE
802.15.4 wireless sensor networks from message injection
attacks. To evaluate the effectiveness of our guardian system,
we set up different use cases in our lab and implement
real-world attacks using open-source attack tools from the
KillerBee suite [5].
A. Experimental Setup
Radio network environment. The experiments are con-
ducted in a fairly typical office environment, located on the
second floor of our university building. The IEEE 802.15.4/
ZigBee network consists of heterogeneous devices operating
on the 2.4 GHz frequency band. The WSN includes the fol-
lowing devices (a floor plan with the positions of deployed
devices is shown in Fig. 6): (i) one PAN coordinator using
the Atmel AVR Wireless Service Suite under Windows XP on
a 2.0 GHz machine with an Atmel RZ USB transceiver, (ii)
two Atmel AVR RAVEN boards equipped with a picoPower
AVR processor, and (iii) six Crossbow MICAz devices running
TinyOS.
Attacker configuration. The attacker is equipped with
an 802.15.4-compliant ZigBee transceiver flashed with the
KillerBee firmware. It can launch a variety of automated
attack vectors against ZigBee networks. Particularly interesting
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Figure 6: Floor plan and experimental setup. The experiments
are conducted in a university lab on the second floor, with
several WLAN access points working in the same frequency
band. Outside positions are located on the roof of the building.
Figure 7: Preventing an unprotected OTA firmware upgrade
with selective interference (measured physical layer baseband
trace).
are attacks which abuse legitimate protocol operations like
launching resource-depletion (DoS) attacks or the intercepting
and manipulating over-the-air (OTA) configurations (including
firmware upgrades and key exchanges).
Guardian configuration. Depending on the respective sce-
nario, we change the type of antenna (either omni-directional
or sector) and its orientation (inside/outside). We use COTS
2.4 GHz antennas, with standard specifications.4
B. Protecting from Unauthorized Messages
1) Controlling Over-the-Air Updates: In this experiment,
an attacker tries to modify the firmware of a ZigBee device
with an Over-The-Air (OTA) configuration update. The off-
the-shelf OTA update functionality of the RZ RAVEN boards
does not require any authentication. The only requirement is
that the node initiating the update is associated to the PAN. The
attack is implemented using KillerBee: with the zbreplay
tool and a spoofed address of the PAN coordinator, an arbitrary
firmware is uploaded to the RZ RAVEN devices. To avoid such
vulnerabilities, the guardian blacklists all OTA configuration
traffic. In order to enforce such a policy, the guardian have to
4Detailed antenna specifications of the antennas used:
• Omni-directional antenna: length: 12 cm, gain: 5 dBi.
• Directional (sector) antenna: length: 16 cm, beam width horizontal:
69.6◦, vertical: 64◦, max. gain: 8 dBi. A data sheet is available at
http://www.wimo.com/download/18560_8.pdf
Figure 8: Resource-depletion attack by flooding the network
with association requests. Outside attackers are effectively
blocked, while indoor operations are not affected.
perform a payload inspection because the information about
packets carrying OTA configuration commands can only be
found in higher layers of the ZigBee protocol stack. More
specifically, it checks for data frames with a certain network
layer control field (0x0008), and a certain ZigBee application
support layer command type (0x01) in the payload of the
packet, resulting in the following rule:
gtables -A -m dst --pan 0xACAC -m nw_ctrl
0x0008 -m asl_cmd 0x01 -j DROP
Fig. 7 shows the baseband trace of an OTA firmware
upgrade packet while it is being blocked by the guardian. A
short, yet precise selective interfering signal hits the middle of
the packet and renders it unusable. Hence, the attacker is no
longer able to modify the firmware of the RZ RAVEN nodes
in the vicinity.
2) Mitigating Resource-Depletion Attacks: Next, the Killer-
Bee toolbox is used to launch a resource depletion attack on
the ZigBee devices. The attack is executed by KillerBee’s
zbflood tool, which floods the PAN coordinator with associ-
ation requests (IEEE 802.15.4 control frames). Under normal
conditions, we verified that this causes our PAN coordinator to
crash repeatably. To make the coordinator operational again,
the node must be reset manually after each crash.
To mitigate this attack, assuming that the attacker is located
outside the room, we deploy the following guardian rule:
gtables -A -m type --control -m dst --pan
0xACAC -m RSS --above -80 -j DROP
The guardian’s policy is to destroy all association requests
(IEEE 802.15.4 control frame type 0xC823) sent to the
network ID 0xACAC, and transmitted from outside. The idea
of this policy is to allow associations from inside the room, but
not from outside (assuming access to the room is physically
secured). To that end, we define outside as an area covered by
the sector antenna and a signal threshold exceeding −80 dBm.5
The guardian’s response is to generate interference using its
omni-directional antenna. We are interested in the success-
ful association request rates from inside (sent by legitimate
sensors) vs. outside positions (sent by KillerBee). The tested
positions are marked in Fig. 6 as I1, . . . , I6 for inside, and
O1, . . . , O6 for outside positions. As can be observed in Fig. 8,
the guardian allows association requests from inside positions
5Admittedly, this definition of outside is not particularly robust, but can
be improved by more sophisticated signal features (see the discussion in
Section VII-A1). The assumption is the guardians are placed at the border
between inside and outside and the attacker’s effective power must be at least
−80 dBm at the guardian’s position to reach the sensor motes located behind
it.
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Figure 9: Instant node revocation: 6 MICAz motes are consec-
utively turned on and start transmitting. After 70 seconds, the
guardian is turned on to selectively block traffic transmitted
from revoked devices (3 motes).
with a probability of over 95 %. However, for senders closer
to the sector antenna, the guardian occasionally blocks (→
positions I1 and I3). This is an artifact of the simple location
detection scheme used. Nevertheless, the attacker’s flooding
rate from outdoor positions is severely limited and this rate is
no longer sufficient to make the PAN coordinator crash from
any outdoor position.
C. Instant Node Revocation
The next attack scenario considers node capture and repli-
cation attacks in WSNs [23], [24]. While this problem is
mainly treated as a key management issue in the literature
[25], [26], we show that compromised sensor motes can also
be removed on the physical layer once they are identified. We
refer to this as instant revocation because once the blocking
rules are committed to the guardian, the motes’ channel access
is instantaneously blocked and they are thus disconnected
from the network; it is not necessary to reliably distribute
a revocation command in the (possibly Byzantine) network.
From the guardian’s perspective, the channel control policy is
to detect packets from revoked nodes by their source addresses
(sensors 0x1111 (I1), 0x1112 (I3), 0x1115 (I5)) and
network ID (0xACAC) and to destroy those packets:
gtables -A -m src --addr 0x1111 --pan
0xACAC -j DROP
gtables -A -m src --addr 0x1112 --pan
0xACAC -j DROP
gtables -A -m src --addr 0x1115 --pan
0xACAC -j DROP
In this experiment, six MICAz motes consecutively start
transmitting with 10 packets/s. After 70 seconds, three nodes
are revoked for 90 seconds, then allowed again for 20 seconds,
and finally revoked for the rest of the experiment. We are
interested in packets from revoked nodes able to reach the
network (false negatives) and the impact of the guardian on
the legitimate traffic (false positives).
The results are shown in Fig. 9. The stepwise traffic increase
is due to the consecutive start of the transmissions. The
black solid line is the cumulative traffic of the nodes to
be revoked, the dashed line shows the traffic of legitimate
nodes, and the overall traffic is depicted by the bars in the
background. As can be seen, the guardian immediately reacts
by completely blocking the traffic from the revoked nodes.
During the revocation phases, the amount of legitimate traffic
equals the overall traffic, so there are no false positives. The
number of false negatives is one packet at the beginning and
at the end of revocation phases (due to the transition of the
guardian’s rule re-configuration).
VII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we provide a discussion on how to lift lim-
itations of our guardian implementation, some non-technical
aspects of its use, and future work opportunities.
A. Lifting Limitations
We first discuss functional extensions to support rules based
on physical features and multi-channel operation to enable
additional applications.
1) Going Beyond Content: The current system implemen-
tation supports classification based on the content of the
packet, such that certain types of attacks (spoofing and replay
attacks) are hard to single out. However, the packet content
is not the only feature extractable from incoming packets:
the physical characteristics of a signal are influenced by RF
propagation phenomena and transmitter characteristics. We al-
ready exploited such signal “meta-data” in the DoS application
scenario (Section VI-B2) by giving the rule system access
to the received signal strength, thwarting a DoS attack that
used replayed packets. Still there is a wide range of additional
physical features that can increase the attack detection options
of our guardian system. We briefly introduce a selection of
features considered in the literature.
Energy-based positioning: Several methods to infer a
sender’s position are proposed in the literature. The use of
power level information such as RSS is used to position
devices precisely [27], even to localize them in large scenarios
[28]. This enables location-aware applications such as geo-
fencing [29]. The guardians could then benefit from rules that
use the sender location in their decision and detect spoofing
attacks [30].
Direction-based positioning: With antenna configurations
such as directional antennas or antenna arrays, guardians can
also gain capabilities of position-based classification; a simple
example use is shown in Section VI-B2. These methods use
the direction of arrival to infer the position of a transmitter.
Angle of arrival information has already been shown to be
valuable for securing WLANs [31].
Link signatures: A more complex method using physical
layer information to position devices is the use of link signa-
tures [32]. This method is able to discern the position of two
devices with a large probability using spectral information and
may be used to prevent spoofing and replay attacks.
Device identification: This analysis method enables to
uniquely identify transmitting devices [33]. For example, the
concept of device fingerprints [34] uses imperfections in the
TX chain of transmitters to associate packets to the transceiver
hardware used. These features are stable and unique enough
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to identify devices even from the same production line. This
technique can be used to whitelist trusted devices, blocking
adversaries that cannot mimic the physical layer behavior of
the devices.6
2) Protecting Multiple Channels in Parallel: Currently, the
guardian implementation supports the protection of a single
IEEE 802.15.4 channel. However, it can be extended to support
the monitoring of multiple channels in parallel, by replicating
the relevant subsystems in the FPGA for each channel. This
only alters the amount of resources used, not the timing
behavior because of the inherent parallelism of the FPGA
architecture. Recent results show that this approach is feasible
by demonstrating that four IEEE 802.15.4 channels can be
received concurrently on the USRP2 platform [36].
B. Non-technical Aspects
Legal Aspects. The intentional generation of interference
may raise the concern whether our guardians can be operated
legally. In general, this question is not simple to answer
because the rules governing spectrum access vary across
countries and frequency bands. The U.S. regulations [37]
mandate in §15.5 that “harmful interference,” an emission that
“obstructs or repeatedly interrupts a radiocommunications ser-
vice operating in accordance with [Chapter 15],” is forbidden.
However, as we limit the interference to adversarial packets
by analyzing and deciding on a per-packet basis, we might
argue that no “service” is interrupted.
Regarding unintentional interference with co-existing net-
works, we point out that the guardian accesses the channel
scarcely. The guardian emits a 26 µs signal per packet and is
silent for the rest of the time (e.g., 998 µs for 32 byte packets).
From the view of a single channel, such a behavior is also
observed for frequency hopping systems such as Bluetooth.
In fact, Bluetooth Power Class 1 devices [38, §7.2] use the
same transmit power (100 mW) as our guardians and occupy a
2 MHz 802.15.4 channel for approximately 25 ms per second,
which is comparable to the emissions of a guardian reacting
to an attacker with maximum rate (1000 packets/s). This
also shows that attacking the guardian infrastructure itself (by
deliberately triggering interference) leads only to a limited
channel occupancy. In addition, as we consider the operation
in the 2.4 GHz band, co-existing devices such as IEEE 802.11
receivers commonly filter out the simple sinusoidal waveform
we chose. Thus, while a comprehensive discussion of the legal
aspects of RF interference is out of scope for this paper (as
well as out of our expertise), we observe that the selective
and efficient operation of the guardians effectively limits
interference, and finally remark that sometimes legislation
follows technical innovation.
Economic Aspects. The guardians are additional infrastruc-
ture that is deployed alongside the sensor network. While this
offers several benefits (central control, on-demand security, or
the possibility to “patch” legacy networks), it may raise the
question of cost. The number of guardian devices depends
on the WSN deployment area and on the desired level of
6While spoofing can still be achieved [35], the attacker must increase its
effort significantly.
protection. Thus, the cost per device should be small; one
option is to implement the system with COTS transceiver and
micro-controller chips, possibly sacrificing flexibility. On the
other hand, recent results also show that it is possible to build
cheaper (∼$ 100) and more energy-efficient SDR platforms
[39].
C. Future Work Opportunities
There are several interesting research opportunities to ex-
tend and refine the guardian concept. In addition to an exten-
sion with more physical layer protocols and physical feature
detectors, we briefly discuss two promising paths.
Optimal guardian deployment. Operating on the physical
layer has benefits but also generates new challenges: we must
aim to detect any packet that might arrive at a network node,
and ensure that all violating packets are destroyed. These
issues make the position and number of guardians important
factors during deployment of the guardian system, and an
optimization based on analytical models along the lines of
Section III would be desirable. Methods that may be applied
for this purpose are presented in information theory literature
in the context of physical layer confidentiality in wireless
networks [40], [41]. These results suggest that by using a
security perimeter around the network attacks can be mitigated
completely because no network devices are then located in
the attack range from all reachable attacker locations. Alterna-
tively, a training phase or site survey can be helpful to support
the optimization of the guardian deployment.
Alternative uses. While the concept of protecting sensor
networks with the guardian system is our main focus, we
note that the generation of selective interference can also be
useful for research on the effects of interference on network
performance, allowing to perform repeatable experiments with
real hardware. Related work in this area uses sensor mote
hardware for interference generation, which limits the capa-
bilities of such interference generation systems [18], [42].
Using the selective and protocol-aware interference generation
capabilities of the guardians, a more fine-grained control
over interference can be achieved. For example, the guardian
system can be deployed in a wireless testbed to generate
arbitrary interference patterns based on packet content. In this
spirit, the guardians may enforce that all ACK packets of
Node 1 are lost, or 10 % of all network traffic is affected
by microwave/WLAN/Bluetooth-like interference following a
bursty pattern. We presented initial steps in this direction
recently [43].
VIII. RELATED WORK
The concept of using selective interference has recently been
proposed in several application areas: to protect implanted
medical devices (IMDs) from malicious readers, to increase
the privacy of RFID tags, and to ensure authentic commu-
nication in WSNs. In contrast to these works, we provide
a system that allows configurable security policies based on
packet content and aims to provide a central protection over
larger distances in a networked setting, in contrast to a reader–
single device setting. A summary of the following comparison
is provided in Table IV.
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System Application area Maximum Guard Blocking criteria Prototype
reaction time distance evaluation
IMD shield [6] Implanted medical 10ms 20 cm Each packet is blocked
√
(USRP2)
devices (IMDs) and selectively forwarded
IMDGuard [7] IMDs Tens of ms 20 cm Guard notices a spoofing attack ∼ (MICAz)
Warlock Duke [44] Improvised explosives (IEDs) n/a n/a (100 m) Any signal in guarded freq. bands
√
(custom)
Blocker Tags [45], [46] RFID 300 µs 20 cm Tag query to protected prefix × (tag)
RFID Guardian [47], [48] RFID 300 µs 1 m Tag query to tag in ACL × (handheld)
Jamming for Good [8] Sensor networks 5ms 2–3 m Address+RSSI of registration packet
√
(MICAz)
[This work], [49] Sensor networks 64 µs 10–20 m Per-packet decision (header+payload)
√
(USRP2)
Table IV: Comparison of related protection systems using physical layer responses.
IMDs face challenges similar to WSNs, namely low com-
putational resources and limited energy. Gollakota et al. [6]
describe an external IMD protection system, or IMD “shield,”
that allows to regulate access to the device using selective
interference, protecting it from malicious readers. The shield
is a battery-powered device that is worn close the implanted
device (∼ 20 cm), e.g., in the form of a pendant. It acts as
a proxy that simultaneously receives and destroys any packet
related to the protected IMD. If the packet is going to the
IMD, the shield checks whether the reader is trusted and
forwards the packet. If the packet originated from the IMD, the
packet is forwarded in encrypted form to the querying reader
to protect the patients’s privacy. A USRP2-based prototype
system is presented, showing that an attacker can only succeed
if it uses high transmit power and close proximity. Xu et
al. [7] also describe an external guardian system that protects
IMDs from untrusted readers. However, the concept relies on
cryptographic protocols and uses the physical layer response
only as a countermeasure to spoofing attacks. In contrast to
these works, we offer configurable policies for several devices
in a distributed sensor network setting.
To protect the privacy of RFID tags from malicious readers,
Juels et al. [45] introduce the “blocker tag” to prevent the
tag discovery by confusing readers with artificial collisions.
The attacker queries a prefix of node IDs (e.g., the first
two bits), and on collisions the reader refines the prefix,
such that the blocker tag can force the reader to traverse
the full address space by generating intentional interference.
Juels and Brainard [46] extend this concept to signal privacy
policies to benign readers. Rieback et al. [47], [48] offer a
similar solution but support the protection of configurable
sets of RFIDs (blocker tags only support address blocks). A
handheld device, the “RFID Guardian,” monitors all queries
and interferes with a tag’s response to hide its presence
from malicious readers. Again, these concepts rely on close
proximity to the protected tags. However, the main difference
to our work is that these schemes do not operate on a per-
packet basis: malicious queries are actually received by the tag,
and only the tag’s response is blocked. This is not problematic
because RFID tags commonly do not keep state information.
With our implementation, we can prevent sensor motes from
receiving any malicious packet, also protecting their internal
state.
A closely related work protects sensor motes from spoofed
packets (based on RSSI information) using selective interfer-
ence [8], [50]. Each data transmission is split in two packets,
a registration packet and a data packet. The protection is
performed by the network motes themselves, analyzing if the
RSSI signature of the registration packet matches with the
claimed source address, and scheduling the transmission of
an interfering packet concurrent with the data packet in case
of a mismatch. However, the requirement that motes must
receive packets that are not addressed to them and send packets
for interference is expensive in terms of energy. So, while
the goals are similar, the approach is different. We explore
the use of specially designed guardian devices that provide
a per-packet central enforcement of access policies, without
requiring a custom MAC protocol.
In the context of firewalls and WSNs, there are also efforts
to bring an on-mote “personal firewall” to sensor networks
[9]. Each incoming packet is inspected, compared to a set of
filter rules, and dropped from the receive queue if necessary.
In contrast to this work, we perform packet filtering using a
centralized infrastructure, lifting the requirement to distribute
and manage the security configuration of each node individu-
ally from a remote position.
In the military context, the U.S. military employs mobile
jamming systems to protect convoys in Iraq from improvised
roadside bombs, stopping a bomb trigger signal from arriving
at the bomb’s receiver [44].7 However, not much is known
about the system’s implementation and operation.
In information theory the concept of secrecy capacity of
broadcast channels with noise was studied extensively, starting
with Wyner’s work on wiretap channels [51]. The goal is
to enable confidential communications without secrets over
a public broadcast channel. Recently, several authors aug-
mented the wiretap channel by considering the creation of
intentional noise to boost the secrecy capacity of the channel.
This approach is known under various designation, such as
artificial noise [52], [53], cooperative jamming [54], [55],
friendly jamming [56], the relay-eavesdropper channel [57],
or the wiretap channel with helping interferer [58]. These
works show that confidentiality in the sense of information
theory can be achieved even if the SINR of the adversary is
higher. Our work is orthogonal to these approaches because
we exploit jamming to control medium access instead of
ensuring message confidentiality at the physical layer, i.e.,
while the jamming in the related work is targeting attackers
7A news article on IED jammers used in the Iraq campaign is available at
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/TECH/08/13/cied.jamming.tech
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to prevent them to receive messages, our approach here is to
jam the nodes in the protected network, preventing them from
receiving unauthorized messages.
Work on wireless network security applies result on the
wiretap channel to prevent information leakage from a pro-
tected geographical area by hindering eavesdroppers using
intentional interference in more practical scenarios. Kim et
al. [40] propose defensive jamming, a method to hinder
eavesdroppers from detecting messages correctly by using
jamming directed towards the outside of the area. The basic
assumption of this approach is that the network deployment
area itself is physically secured, so that the eavesdropper
must remain outside a surrounding security perimeter. The
authors perform an analysis of jammer placement strategies
based on the SINR model and show that eavesdropping can be
prevented successfully by an appropriate geometrical jammer
placement. The work of Sankararaman et al. [41] analyzes
similar attack scenarios and presents algorithms for optimal
jamming power assignment and jammer placement, both for
a fixed number of jammers and a near-optimal number of
jammers. While the methods used on these works can be
adapted to analyze the performance and deployment of our
guardian system, this work is orthogonal because they consider
passive (eavesdropping) attackers, while we focus on active
(injecting) attackers.
IX. CONCLUSION
Wireless sensor networks are exposed to various kinds
of attacks that can be launched by exploiting the open ac-
cess characteristics of the physical broadcast medium. While
cryptographic techniques at higher layers may often counter
these threats, real-world networks often do not apply those
techniques or have flawed implementations that still open
possible attack vectors to adversaries. We have presented a
guardian system operating on the physical layer as a practical
solution to solve the wireless channel access problem, and
demonstrated the feasibility of our approach with a full system
implementation. Our concept offers flexible solution with per-
packet access rules and the ability to enforce them from a
central point in the network. Our evaluation shows that our
implementation fulfills the strict real-time constraints when
blocking high-throughput traffic with a reaction time of 39 µs
while achieving a blocking success rate of over 99.9 %.
We have further shown in several application scenarios that
the guardians prevent attacks that exploit the open channel
characteristics of wireless networks, and successfully reclaim
air dominance from the adversary.
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